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INTRODUCTION

New cases arise quite regularly regarding real estate brokers dealing
with the issues of employment and their rights to compensation. Because brokerage commission cases are seen frequently by judges in
every jurisdiction, it is important to note the law and the views among
the states as to the treatment of this issue. Of particular interest is the
fact that some jurisdictions, including Arizona, California, Hawaii,
Rhode Island, and Texas, are seemingly ignoring brokerage statutes in
favor of quantum meruit.' The complete deviation from the law by
some jurisdictions is the focus of this Comment.
Consider a simple case of a real estate broker who brought the
buyer and seller together and sues to recover her commission when
that right to collect commission was not in writing nor signed by the
seller. Should the broker be entitled to a commission even though
there is no writing evidencing such a sale? Consider further that the
court holds that as long as the broker procured a ready, willing, and
able buyer then the broker was entitled to collect her commission
even without a written contract evidencing that right.
On the face of this scenario it seems as if the court held correctly;
actually, half of the states would agree with this holding.2 But, assume
that the jurisdiction where the case arose also requires the broker to
have a written agreement signed by the party that will pay the commission (usually the seller) in order to collect the brokerage commission. Is the court still correct in its holding? The answer seems clear:
if a jurisdiction has a Statute of Frauds requirement, then it should
first be determined whether or not a written contract exists between
the broker and the seller. If there is no writing, then there is no reason for a court to jump to the second inquiry: whether the broker
procured a ready, willing, and able buyer. Surprisingly, a minority of
courts around the nation are disregarding the Statute of Frauds requirement in favor of equity. Are these courts really choosing equity,
or are they simply ignoring the relevant statutes?
The Statute of Frauds was enacted in the English Parliament in 1677
and required certain contracts, including those involving real estate
transactions, to be in writing. 3 Land ownership was very important to
the early English nobility because it was a way to define status in society.4 The writing requirement was considered to be sufficient to protect the seller's and buyer's interests. 5 There are two main historic
purposes of the Statute of Frauds: (1) to prevent the occurrence of
1. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
2. 10 PATRICK J. ROHAN ET AL., REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE LAW & PRACTICE
§ 2.03[3], at 2-42, n.60 (2002).
3. GEORGE J. SIEDEL, III, ET AL., REAL ESTATE LAW 206 (5th ed. 2003).
4. ROBIN PAUL MALLOY & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 146-47 (1998).
5. See id. at 146.
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fraud against an innocent "party on the false assertion that an agreement to sell land had been reached, when in fact" there was no such
agreement, and (2) to protect the social status of the landowner by
evidencing the landowner's intent to purposefully part with his land.6
The Statute of Frauds covering contracts that must be in writing is
comprised of five different types, including a contract on the "sale of
lands, tenements, or hereditaments, or any interest in or concerning
them." 7 Many legislatures have, over time, added specific language to
the Statute of Frauds to include brokerage agreements. 8 The inclusion
of such language in statutes was in direct response to the numerous
claims brought by brokers, sellers, and buyers of real estate.9 The
adoption of the statutes was "to avoid surprise or confusion to the
principal concerning his or her obligations." 10
Generally, the Statute of Frauds prevents "the enforcement of oral
agreements unless there is a writing signed by the party to be
charged,"" and in terms of brokerage agreements, the same goal was
to be accomplished by extending the written requirement to the commission statement.' 2 In some states, the brokerage listing agreement
is included within the Statute of Frauds and, therefore, it also must be
in writing.13 States that require some form of Statute of Frauds in real
estate transactions require that the names of the parties, the percentage of commission, and an exact description of the property be included in the listing agreement.1 4 The Statute of Frauds requirement
does not insist that the writing be formal. 5 The writing requirement
in a contract for the sale of land can be satisfied by a "memorandum
[that] set[s] out the essential terms such as the names of the parties, a
description of the property, and the intent to buy and sell." 16
Approximately half of the states have some form of Statute of
Frauds requirement governing the ability of a real estate broker to
6. See id.
7. JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 68, at 341 (4th ed.
2001).
8. ARTHUR R. GAUDIO, REAL ESTATE BROKERAGE LAW 155 (1987).
9. See id. (citing 2 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 416 (5th
prtg. 1979 & Supp. 1997)).
10. Id. The Supreme Court of Arizona stated that legislatures have included brokerage agreements in the Statute of Frauds because "li]t was thought that the parties
should reduce to writing their agreement and not rely upon the uncertainties of their
memories as to what the understanding and agreement was." Murphy v. Smith, 226 P.
206, 207 (Ariz. 1924).
11. MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 4, at 133.
12. See BENJAMIN N. HENSZEY & RONALD M. FRIEDMAN, REAL ESTATE LAW 109
(2d ed. 1984).
13. SIEDEL, III ET AL., supra note 3, at 163.
14. Id.
15. See MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 4, at 146 (explaining that inclusion of all the
parties' terms is not required by the Statute of Frauds).
16. Id.
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collect the brokerage commission. 17 The purpose of this requirement
is to protect the seller from unscrupulous brokers who argue that they
have procured a sale when in fact no sale of property ever took
place.1 8 The listing agreement and contract both serve as vital evidence in determining whether an agreement actually occurred.1 9

States that require a written agreement have a two-step process in
determining whether or not the broker is entitled to a commission.20
The first inquiry is whether a written agreement exists that is signed
by the party to be charged, and the second inquiry is whether the bro-

ker procured a ready, willing, and able buyer.
A minority of the states that require some form of a written agreement are simply ignoring the statute as evidenced by their avoidance
of the first inquiry altogether (whether there is a written agreement),
and instead, focusing only on the procuring cause question in favor of
equity. 22 While equity and quantum meruit are valuable alternatives

to some failed contracts, they are not warranted in cases dealing with
licensed real estate brokers who fail to get commission statements in
writing because, as licensed professionals, these brokers should be required and expected to follow their guidelines in order to protect
themselves as well as the seller or buyer.
Part II of this Comment will discuss real estate commissions in general. Part III will discuss different views of real estate transactions
across the nation. Then, in Part IV, this Comment will suggest that a

festering minority of courts in states that have a Statute of Frauds requirement are currently disregarding the statutes or simply ignoring
17. The following states have a form of the Statute of Frauds:

ALASKA STAT.

§ 09.25.010(a)(8) (Michie 2002); ARIz.

REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-101 (West 2003); CAL.
CIv. CODE § 1624 (West 1985 & Supp. 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-325a (2002);
HAW. REV. STAT. § 656-1 (2002); IDAHO CODE § 9-508 (Michie 1998); IND. CODE

§ 32-21-1-10 (Michie 2002); IOWA CODE § 622.32 (1997); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 371.010 (Banks-Baldwin 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13177 (West 1992);
ANN.

MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 259, § 7 (West 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 566.108
(1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 82.33 (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 28-2-903 (2003);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 36-107 (2000); NEV. REV. STAT. 645.320 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 25:1-16 (West 1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-1-45 (Michie 2002); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG.

§ 5-701 (McKinney 2002); OR. REV. STAT. § 41.580 (2001); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 91-4 (1997); TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1101.806(c) (Vernon 2004); UTAH CODE ANN.
LAWS

§ 25-5-4 (1998); VA. CODE ANN. § 11-2 (Michie 1999 & Supp. 2003); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN.

§ 19.36.010 (West 2002); Wis.

STAT. ANN.

§ 240.10 (West 2001). "Com-

mission" is not to be confused with "compensation." See GAUDIO, supra note 8, at
111. Commission refers to the productivity of the broker that produces the required
result. Id. Compensation includes all forms of remuneration: damages that the broker may be entitled to because of an unauthorized sale or withdrawal of the property
or damages for tortious acts against the broker. Id.
18. HENSZEY & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 109.

19. See id.
20. See GEORGE LEFCOE, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 52, 62-65 (3d ed. 1999).
21. See id. at 53, 64; see also discussion infra Part III.B (describing the majority
and minority default rules regarding the ready, willing, and able buyer rule).
22. See discussion infra Part IV.
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them in favor of the law of equity. Part V suggests that because some
courts are ignoring the statutes, these states should reinforce their
Statute of Frauds requirement by adopting language expressly stating
that the statute must be followed and no commission can be granted
even in quantum meruit in the absence of a written agreement.

II.

REAL ESTATE COMMISSIONS

This section reviews the different aspects required in a real estate
transaction. The focus will be on real estate brokers, listing agreements, and how a broker collects the brokerage commission.
A.

Listing Agreements

The first document signed in a real estate transaction is the listing
agreement.2 3 This agreement is not an offer to sell, but it allows the
broker to place the seller's property on the broker's list of properties
for sale.24 In this agreement, the seller designates a broker as the
agent and promises to pay the broker a commission for finding a
buyer willing to buy on the seller's terms. 25 In return for the commission, the broker promises to work diligently 26 in finding a ready, willing, and able buyer. 27 Generally, brokers are retained in order to find
a buyer of the real estate and then to negotiate the purchase. 28 Brokers are also employed for other purposes such as locating rental
property, tenants for rental property, or buyers for businesses. 29 The
basic rights and duties of both the seller and the broker are established by the listing agreement.30 Under the listing agreement, the
broker does not have the authority to bind the client to a contract, but
the broker only agrees to locate a buyer willing to purchase the property according to the seller's terms. 3
Listing agreements come in three basic forms.3 2 The first form is an
exclusive right to sell agreement, which is most often used by brokers
simply because it favors the broker over the seller.3 3 The exclusive
23. LEFCOE, supra note 20, at 52.

24. Id.
25. Id.
26. A broker works diligently when he or she exercises the reasonable skill and
common prudence that the average broker with the same background would possess.
See Myers v. Adler, 176 S.W. 538, 540 (Mo. Ct. App. 1915).
27. LEFCOE, supra note 20, at 52.
28. See ROHAN, ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.02[1], at 2-17.
29. GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 143.
30. HENSZEY & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 339. "The legal relationship created
by the employment or listing agreement is a type of agency relationship." Id. at 335.
Generally, "[a]n agency relationship results in giving one person the power to affect
the contractual liability of another." Id. The agent (broker) acts on behalf of the
principal (seller) in dealing with a third party. See id. at 341.
31. Id. at 336.
32. See SIEDEL, III ET AL., supra note 3, at 163-64.
33. Id.
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right to sell agreement entitles the broker to a commission even if the
broker on the agreement does not find the eventual buyer.3 4 Under
this type of agreement, the broker does not actually have the right to
sell the property, but rather the broker only has the right to arrange
for the sale of the property.
The second type of agreement is an
exclusive agency agreement where the broker is listed as the exclusive
agent, but the seller is able to avoid paying a commission if the seller,
instead of the broker, locates the buyer.36 Finally, the open listing
agreement allows the broker to act as an agent in securing a buyer for
the seller. 37 Here, the seller reserves the right to sell the property
without having to pay a commission and also reserves the right to
enter into other listing agreements with other brokers. 38 The open
listing agreement is most favorable for the seller, but it is not used as
frequently as the exclusive right to sell agreement because sellers generally do not seek the advice of an attorney regarding their real estate
transaction. 39
B.

Commissions

1. Different State Requirements for Collecting
Brokerage Commissions
A real estate broker must find a ready, willing, and able buyer, and
then negotiate the sale of real estate in order to collect the fee or
commission.4" The listing agreement usually dictates the broker's
right to commission in terms of the fee and when the broker will receive the payment. 4 Generally, the seller of real property employs
the real estate broker, but the broker may also be employed by the
buyer and could also be employed by both the buyer and seller at the
same time.4 2 There are certain prerequisites that must be met in order
for a real estate broker to recover brokerage commissions: (1) the
broker must prove a contract of employment; 43 (2) the broker must be
licensed at the time of rendering services; 44 and (3) the broker must be
the procuring cause of the sale.4 5
Twenty-four states require a written contract evidencing the contract between the broker and the seller or buyer in order for the bro34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

See id. at 163.
HENSZEY & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 333.
SIEDEL, III ET AL., supra note 3, at 164.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See ROHAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.02[1], at 2-19.
HENSZEY & FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 339.
ROHAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.02[l], at 2-18.
Id. § 2.02[1], at 2-18.1.
Id. § 2.02[1], at 2-18.1 to 2-19.
Id. § 2.02[1], at 2-19.
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ker to collect the brokerage commission,4 6 while the rest of the states
do not require that the contract be written. 47 For those states that fall
in the former group, the following issues are considered when determining if the brokerage agreement is adequate: (1) the agreement
must be "in writing and signed by the person to be charged with a
commission"; 48 (2) the agreement "promises that a definite commission will be paid, or refers to a written commission schedule"; 49 (3) the
agreement "specifies the name of the broker to whom the commission
will be paid";5 ° and (4) the agreement must, "by itself or by reference
to some other existing writing, identify with a reasonable certainty the
land to be conveyed." 5 1 Further, two questions must be asked by the
court when determining whether the broker is entitled to the commission.52 First, the court must ask whether there is a written contract
signed by the party to be charged.5 3 If the answer is yes, then the
court must answer whether the broker was the procuring cause of the
contract.54 If there was no writing, then the inquiry ends, and the conclusion is that the broker is not entitled to the commission. 55
For the group of states that have no written requirement, the court
must only ask whether the broker procured the closing. 56 The procuring cause question is further divided into majority and minority default rules.57 The majority rule states that the broker must: (1) locate
a buyer that is ready, willing, and able to buy on the terms fixed by the
owner, and (2) ensure that the buyer enters into a binding contract
with the owner to buy the property. 58 The minority default rule follows the same two rules above, but adds a third requirement: the contract must close title by the terms of the contract.5 9
46. See supra note 17. Massachusetts and New York both require a written agreement, but the statutes expressly exclude licensed real estate brokers from such re-

quirement. See

MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 259, § 7
LAW § 5-701(a)(10) (Consol. 1977 & Supp. 2002).

(West 1992); N.Y.

GEN. OBLIG.

47. See ROHAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.03[3], at 2-42 n.60.
48. Id. § 4.06[1], at 4-62.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See LEFCOE, supra note 20, at 52, 62-65.
53. See id. at 52.
54. See id. at 62-65.
55. Harry B. Lucas Co. v. Grand Dallas Warehouse, No. 3:01-CV-0938-M, 2002
WL 1489504, at *3 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2002), affd, 2003 WL 342256. An action for the
recovery of brokerage conmission may not be brought unless the agreement is in
writing and signed by the party to be charged. Id.
56. See Circle T Corp. v. Deerfield, 444 P.2d 404, 406 (Colo. 1968). Colorado does
not require the agreement to be in writing in order for a broker to receive his commission. Rather the focus is on whether or not the broker found "a purchaser who is
ready, willing, and able to complete the purchase of real estate." COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 12-61-201 (2003).
57. See LEFCOE, supra note 20, at 63-64.
58. Id. at 63.
59. See id. at 63-64.
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For those states that require a form of the Statute of Frauds to be
met before the broker receives the commission, most will not allow
for equitable recovery because to hold otherwise would be to nullify
the statute.6" The broker is presumed to know the law of the state
and, therefore, cannot resort to the theory of quantum meruit or equitable estoppel if the broker fails to secure a written contract. 6' The
writing requirement may be satisfied by the written listing agreement,
escrow instructions, or the purchase-and-sale agreement.62
2.

Purpose of Statute of Frauds in Regard to Real Estate
Brokers' Commissions

Generally, the majority of states that have some form of Statute of
Frauds do not allow recovery in quantum meruit because to do otherwise would be to nullify the statute completely. 63 The Restatement of
Contracts states:
It is provided by statute that a real estate broker shall have no right
to a commission for making a sale unless he has a contract or authority in writing from his principal. A broker who makes a sale for
his principal without such written contract
or authority cannot get
64
judgment for the value of his services.
The Statute of Frauds requirement satisfies many purposes, among
those being that it reinforces the importance of the transactional process between the seller and buyer, protects against brokers who may
falsely claim commissions against a seller, and protects brokers against
sellers who falsely deny what they owe. 65 The writing further helps
parties avoid unwanted brokerage relationships.66 There are some
negative aspects to this requirement, and most likely for some of the
following reasons, some states do not have this written contract requirement. 67 First, the formality of the requirement hinders participation of part-time brokers.6 8 Second, this requirement greatly increases
the amount of paperwork that will lead to disputes over the terms.6 9
Third, most sellers do not hire their own attorneys to look over the
contracts; therefore, brokers are able to construct the agreements in
60. C. C. Marvel, Annotation, Real-Estate Broker's Right to Recover in Quantum
Meruit for Services Although Contract is Not in Writing as Required by Statute, 41
A.L.R.2d 905, 908 (1955).
61. LEFCOE, supra note 20, at 53.
62. Id.
63. See Marvel, supra note 60, at 908.
64. See id. at 907 (quoting RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACrS § 355(3) illus. 7
(1932)).
65. LEFCOE, supra note 20, at 54.
66. Perry J. Woodward, Comment, IntentionalInterference with Prospective Economic Advantage: A Tort that Eviscerates the Real Estate Brokers' Statute of Frauds,36
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1219, 1224-26 (1996).
67. LEFCOE, supra note 20, at 53.
68. Id.
69. Id.
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their own favor.7 0 Finally, the requirement is redundant and "contradicts trade practice in many commercial market segments where brokers rely on oral listings. '"71

III.

THE THREE VIEWS AMONG STATES REGARDING TREATMENT
OF BROKERS SUING FOR COMMISSIONS

Among the states, three different views are found in regard to the
treatment of brokers suing for commissions.7 2 These views include:
(1) states that have some form of Statute of Frauds requirement; (2)
states that do not require the brokerage agreement to be in writing in
order for the broker to collect the brokerage commission; and (3)
states that expressly exempt real estate brokers from the Statute of
Frauds.
A.

74
States that Have Some Form of Statute of Frauds Requirement

The first trend includes those states that require by statute (either
through a special provision in the Statute of Frauds, through provisions in licensing statutes, or through administrative agencies) that the
brokerage contract must be in writing in order for the broker to collect the commission.7 5 It is in this category that some jurisdictions
disregard the written contract requirement when determining whether
the broker is entitled to a commission, and instead, only apply the rule
that the broker find a ready, willing, and able buyer.7 6
1.

States with Special Provisions of the Statute of Frauds

In response to numerous claims for commissions, many state legislatures decided to include brokerage agreements in their Statute of
Frauds requirement. 77 For example, California's Statute of Frauds includes a provision requiring brokers to obtain a signed writing evidencing the commission agreement between the parties.78 The theory
behind requiring the additional brokerage agreement is to provide
more security for the parties by giving them the ability to deny quan70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See discussion infra Parts III.A-C.
73. See discussion infra Parts III.A-C.
74. See LEFCOE, supra note 20, at 53 n.152.
75. See id.
76. "Able" means the buyer has "the necessary funds available to make the payments required and closing the deal within the specified time"; a "willing buyer is one
who is willing to enter into a" binding contract; and a "ready" buyer is one who has
been identified by name and intends to complete the transaction. EDMUND F. FICEK
ET AL., REAL ESTATE PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES 308-09 (6th ed. 1994).
77. See LEFCOE, supra note 20, at 52-53.
78. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(a)(3) (West 1985 & Supp. 2004).
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turn meruit claims by the brokers.79 States with special provisions presume that the brokers know the law.8"
2.

States with Licensing Commission Regulations or
Administrative Rules8"

With licensing commission regulations, the problem arises where
the written contract requirement is not a part of the Statute of Frauds,
but rather falls under the licensing or administrative regulation set
forth by the real estate commission of a jurisdiction. 8 It is in these
cases when the question arises as to whether the seller can use the
written contract requirement "as a defense to a broker's suit for the
commission." 8 3 Courts deciding these cases generally hold that the
regulations adopted by the licensing commission have the full force
and effect of law.84 Because licensing and administrative regulations
can be amended or revoked at any time by these agencies, it has been
suggested that these states' legislatures should adopt the licensing regulations in order to maintain consistency, as well as to clear up any
confusion as to whether or not the regulation is the law.8 5
B.

States that Do Not Require the Brokerage Agreement to
Be in Writing

The second view includes states that have a general Statute of
Frauds requirement but do not require a written contract in order for
the broker to earn the brokerage commission, and instead, focus only
on whether the broker produced a ready, willing, and able buyer.8 6
The procuring cause doctrine has default rules that include both a majority and minority position as to its application.8 7
The majority default rule holds that the brokerage payment becomes due at closing; however, the seller is liable for the commission
even if the contract does not close through no fault of the seller.88
This rule is favored by brokers because most of the work is completed
by the time a willing buyer is found, and most importantly, it deters
the seller and buyer from trying to cheat brokers out of their commissions.8 9 The minority default rule does not allow brokers to recover
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

See LEFCOE, supra note 20, at 53.
Id.
Id. at 53 n.152.
GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 156.
Id.
See Green Mountain Realty, Inc. v. Fish, 336 A.2d 187, 189 (Vt. 1975); see also
ROHAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 4.05[1], at 4-43.
85. GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 159.
86. See ROHAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.03[3], at 2-42.
87. See LEFCOE, supra note 20, at 62-64.
88. Id. at 62. Many times, if the contract fails through no fault of the seller, the
broker will not demand payment in order to maintain good relationships. Id.
89. Id. at 63.
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their commissions when the deal fails. 90 Here, the commission is
earned when the ready, willing, and able buyer enters into a binding
contract, and the transaction is completed by closing the title to the
the broker is entitled to contract around
property. 9' In some states,
92
rules.
default
two
the
Although these states have not included brokerage agreements in
the traditional Statute of Frauds requirement, the statute may still apply.93 For instance, if the broker receives some interest in the land as
part of the commission owed to him or the employment contract between the broker and the owner may not be completed within a year,
then the situation would fall directly under the traditional Statute of
Frauds writing requirement and, therefore, a traditional Statute of
Frauds defense could be utilized. 94
C.

States with Statute of Frauds Excluding Real Estate Brokers
from the Writing Requirement

The third view includes states in which the respective pertinent statute expressly states that the licensed real estate broker or salesperson
does not fall under the Statute of Frauds.9 In these states, it is assumed that licensed professionals have more knowledge and experience than others who just act as brokers; therefore, the licensed
brokers are exempt.96 The New York Appellate Division reasoned
that excluding licensed real estate brokers from the brokerage Statute
of Frauds did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the United
States Constitution or the New York Constitution because the state
had a rational basis in holding the licensed professionals to a higher
degree of knowledge and skill.9 7 Furthermore, the purpose of New
York's statute in limiting who the written requirement is applied to is
a
to protect against fraud and mistake; both of which, it is assumed,
98
licensed professional will be aware of and not allow to occur.
New York's Statute of Frauds requirement excluding licensed brokers, however, is the exception to those states that do require licensed
real estate brokers to obtain a written commission statement for the
purpose of protecting real estate owners against unfounded claims
90. Id.
91. Id. at 64.
92. Id. at 64-65.
93. See ROHAN ET AL., supra note 2, § 2.03[3], at 2-47.
94. Id.
95. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 259, § 7 (requiring brokerage agreements to
be in writing but exempting licensed brokers and salespersons from its requirements);
N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-701(a)(10) (Consol. 1977 & Supp. 2002) (requiring brokerage agreements to be in writing, but exempting licensed brokers and salespersons
from its requirements).
96. See GAUDIO, supra note 8, at 155-56.
97. Traver v. Betts, 442 N.Y.S.2d 195, 197 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981).
98. See Shaftel v. Dadras, 39 F. Supp. 2d 217, 228 (E.D. N.Y. 1999).
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made by licensed real estate brokers.9 9 When a licensed broker is
hired, the client expects a trained and knowledgeable professional. 10 0
To ensure the seller's protection, a majority of the states require the
broker to obtain a written agreement, and if the licensed broker
chooses not to, then they should expect no assistance from the law. 10 1
New York's exclusion of the licensed professional puts forth great
faith in such brokers where approximately twenty-five other states do
not. 102
IV.

ILLUSTRATION OF THE FESTERING MINORITY-COURTS

THAT

APPLY THE COMMON-LAW RULE OF EQUITY IN SPITE OF
THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS

Even though the states that fall under this category require some
written agreement, some courts are refusing to apply the writing requirement or are finding ways around the rule. 0 3 A good illustration
of state courts misapplying the law is the Frady v. May"0 4 case from
the Fort Worth Court of Appeals in Texas."0 5 Following the discussion
of Frady v. May, there will be an overview of the other jurisdictions
that are ignoring the Statute of Frauds to show that this is a problem,
and if not dealt with, fraudulent behavior will continue
despite the
06
attempts of the legislatures to protect the parties.'
A.

Example: Texas in Frady v. May

Bart May sued E.N. Frady and Marsha Frady in order to receive his
brokerage commission on the sale of a farm after the Fradys had allegedly released the buyer from an earlier contract negotiated by May
and then closed under a new contract on similar terms, but without
the inclusion of the brokerage commission agreement. 10 7 May and the
Fradys initially signed a listing agreement in which the Fradys agreed
to pay May a six percent commission on the sale of the farm. 0 8 Because May was unable to find a buyer by the termination date of the
agreement, it expired.'0 9 May and the Fradys then orally agreed to
continue the relationship. 1 0 Nichols, the buyer, contacted May and
99. Patrick J. Rohan, Title Insurance, Deeds, Binders, Brokers and Beyond, N.Y.
ST. B.J., Oct. 2000, at 49, 53; see 12 C.J.S. Brokers § 122 (1980 & Supp. 2003).
100. MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 4, at 55.
101. See LEFCOE, supra note 20, at 53.

102. See id. at 52.
103. See, e.g., Frady v. May, 23 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet.
denied).
104. 23 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).
105. See id.
106. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
107. Frady, 23 S.W.3d at 560.
108. Id. at 561.
109. Id.
110. Id.
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agreed to buy the property.11 1 The parties negotiated a contract that
contained a closing provision stating if the closing did not occur by
August 1, the non-defaulting party was entitled to terminate the contract.11 2 The contract contained a commission agreement that stated
May was entitled to his commission on the closing of the sale, on termination of the contract-except as permitted by its terms or if the
closing was prevented by the seller. 1 3 The contract also contained a
financing paragraph that gave the buyer thirty days to acquire financing, and if he was unable to do so, then the contract was to be
terminated."1 4
15
Nichols was unable to close within the allotted amount of time.'
May did not prepare a written extension of the contract. 1 6 On September 15, Nichols signed a second contract with the Fradys, without
notice to May. 11 7 The second contract did not include a commission
provision for May.' 18 Shortly after the second contract closed, May
filed suit against the parties to recover his commission, arguing that
Nichols and the Fradys intentionally failed to notify him of the second
contract in order to avoid paying May his commission for bringing the
parties together under the original contract.'1 9 The trial court held
that the commission was not contingent upon the sale closing under a
specific contract and, therefore, because May was the procuring cause
of the final sale and the buyer found was ready, willing, and able to
buy, May was entitled to his commissions. 2 ° The
Fort Worth Court of
2
Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment.' '
1. Analysis
The Court of Appeals correctly cited to the Texas Real Estate Licensing Act (hereinafter TRELA) by stating that a broker will not
earn the commission if the broker does not comply with the requirements of the Act. 22 Section 1101.806(c) states:
A person may not maintain an action in this state to recover a commission for the sale or purchase of real estate unless the promise or
agreement on which the action is based, or a memorandum, is in
writing and signed by the party against whom the action is brought
or by a person authorized by that party to sign the document.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 561-62.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 566.
Id. at 562.
TEX. Occ. CODE

ANN.

§ 1101.806(c) (Vernon 2003).
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The court then discussed the Goodwin v. Gunter12 case, in which
the Texas Supreme Court established that a broker is entitled to the
commission when he procures a buyer. 125 The court continued by
looking at past Texas cases that have rejected the argument that "a
broker's right to a commission hinges on his actual negotiation or continued employment through the time of the final consummation of the
sale.' 126 The fact that the broker's commission is not contingent upon
his actual negotiation or continued employment is simply a description of an exclusive right to sale agreement where the broker's commission does not rest on his finding the eventual buyer. 12 7 The court
was correct in its characterization of the type of agreement that was
established in this case, but the type of agreement does not mean that
the initial inquiry of whether
or not there was a written agreement is
28
no longer applicable.1
The court erred in Frady because it relied primarily on common law
that supports the procuring cause doctrine without also relying on the
TRELA. 1 9 By relying only on common law, the Court of Appeals
missed the point that the Act purposely sets forth. 3 ' In allowing the
first contract that expired to carry over the commission provision to
the final agreement, the court essentially ignored the TRELA in order
to accommodate the broker.' While equity is an important principle
to apply in many cases, it should not have been applied in Frady, or in
other cases where the statute specifically states that a broker does not
earn a commission without a written contract because the statute explicitly states that no commission
can be earned without a written bro13 2
kerage commission agreement.
All fifty states have some form of licensing commission that oversees real estate brokers.' 33 Upon hiring a broker, the relationship between the client and broker is governed by contract law and agency
law.t 3 4 Because brokers are considered fiduciaries, they have professional duties to the client that they must meet. 3 5 As professionals,
brokers should be held to higher standards than the seller and buyer
involved in the real estate transaction because the broker is consid124.
125.
126.
127.

109 Tex. 56, 185 S.W. 295 (1916).
Frady, 23 S.W.3d at 562.
Id. at 563.
See LEFCOE, supra note 20, at 58.
128. See TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1101.806(c).
129. See Frady, 23 S.W.3d at 564-65 (stating that the commission agreement was
not conditional upon the sale closing under the first contract that had expired).
130. See Denman v. Hall, 144 Tex. 633, 636, 193 S.W.2d 515, 516 (1946) (stating that
"[the effect of this statute is to require that contracts by which an agent is employed
to buy or sell real estate must be in writing").
131. See Frady, 23 S.W.3d at 565.
132. See TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 1101.806(c).
133. MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 4, at 52.
134. Id. at 54.
135. Id. at 55.
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ered a fiduciary.' 36 The broker, as a fiduciary, is expected to "perform
competently . . . [and] to observe high ethical standards of behavior."' 37 In Frady, the broker could have easily requested the exten-

sion to be in writing before he continued working further for the
seller.' 38 Despite the broker's failure to follow the licensing require-

ments, the court still granted his commission.139 It is true that the Fort
Worth Court of Appeals is in the minority, but this minority
stretches
14 0
across the nation and it seems to be holding strong.
An argument could be made that the statute allows for quantum

meruit to be applied in certain cases in order to protect the broker.
The Texas Supreme Court, however, has ruled that the TRELA is to
be strictly followed.1 4 ' To allow brokers their commissions when written agreements do not exist would be to eviscerate the brokerage statute.142 Moreover, the court that decided Frady v. May is among the

minority of 1 jurisdictions
that allow for exceptions to the writing
43
requirement.

2.

Comparison of Other Texas Courts' Treatment of Statute of
Frauds in Relation to Frady

The Texas Supreme Court has consistently held that the brokerage
statute is to be complied with if brokers are to earn their commissions.1 44 For example, in Texas Builders v. Keller, the Texas Supreme
Court held that brokers will not be entitled to brokerage commissions

unless they comply with the TRELA, Section 1101.806(c).

45

The pur-

pose of the TRELA "is to prevent fraud arising from parol testimony. '146 Also, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Texas held that the TRELA is to be strictly
construed and
147
that there is no room for an equitable exception.
The appellate courts in Texas have also consistently held that bro-

kers are not entitled to commissions without written agreements. In
136. See id. at 54-55.
137. See id. at 55.
138. See Frady v. May, 23 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet.
denied).
139. See id. at 566.
140. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
141. See Trammel Crow Co. No. 60 v. Harkinson, 944 S.W.2d 631, 635 (Tex. 1997).
The court notes that the legislature was clear: "[A] broker may not recover a commission unless the commission agreement is in writing." Id.
142. See id.
143. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
144. See Tex. Builders v. Keller, 928 S.W.2d 479, 480 (Tex. 1996) (holding that real
estate brokers may not circumvent requirements of the Real Estate Licensing Act);
see also Denman v. Hall, 144 Tex. 633, 636, 193 S.W.2d 515, 516 (1946) (noting that
real estate agreements are unenforceable unless they are in writing).
145. See Tex. Builders, 928 S.W.2d at 481.
146. Denman, 144 Tex. at 636, 193 S.W.2d at 516.
147. Harry B. Lucas Co. v. Grand Dallas Warehouse, No. 3:01-CV-0938-M, 2002
WL 1489504, at *5-6 (N.D. Tex. July 9, 2002), affd, 2003 WL 342256.
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1970, the Houston Court of Civil Appeals acknowledged that the
TRELA must be strictly complied with in order for the broker to earn
the brokerage commission.' 4 8 In 1987, the Dallas Court of Appeals

reiterated its previous holding "that in the absence of a written agreement complying with Texas Revised Civil Statutes Annotated, article
6573a, a real estate claim for commission is unenforceable even if the

'
broker was the procuring cause of the sale." 149
Other appellate courts

have also held that without a written agreement the broker is not entitled to a brokerage commission. 150

If the Texas Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals applying Texas law, as well as many courts of appeals across Texas hold
that brokers cannot earn a brokerage commission unless the TRELA
is complied with, then how did the Fort Worth Court of Appeals make
its decision? 15 1 The court went against mandatory case precedent, 152
as
the Texas appellate courts.

well as against the majority trend among

Because the Licensing Act has been adopted as law, then it must be a
part of a court's analysis regarding the earnings of brokerage commissions. 1 53 The Fort Worth Court of Appeals is not alone in its misapplication of the law regarding the collection of brokerage commissions.
B. Survey

Out of the twenty-six states that have some form of Statute of

Frauds requirement, five states,1 54 including Texas, are home to a mi-

nority of courts that find ways around the writing requirement in order to hold in favor of the broker. 1 55 Some courts have done so by

reclassifying the broker and seller relationship, allowing for the doctrine of estoppel, or by ignoring the Statute of Frauds requirement in
148. Stafford v. Smith, 458 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1970, no writ).
149. Campagna v. Lisotta, 730 S.W.2d 382, 384-85 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no
writ) (citing Sherman v. Bruton, 497 S.W.2d 316, 321 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1983, no
writ)).
150. Brice v. Eastin, 691 S.W.2d 54, 57 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ);
Mills v. PMP Mobile Home & Trailer Park, 630 S.W.2d 749, 750 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1982, no writ); Bayer v. McDade, 610 S.W.2d 171, 172 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Taylor v. Neal, 467 S.W.2d 197, 198 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1971, writ dism'd).
151. See Frady v. May, 23 S.W.3d 558 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. denied).
152. See id.; see also Tex. Builders v. Keller, 928 S.W.2d 479, 480 (Tex. 1996) (holding that real estate brokers may not circumvent requirements of the Real Estate Licensing Act); Denman v. Hall, 144 Tex. 633, 636, 193 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Tex. 1946)
(noting that real estate agreements for commission are unenforceable unless they are
in writing).
153. See Denman, 144 Tex. at 636, 193 S.W.2d at 516.
154. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
155. See Ellingson v. Sloan, 527 P.2d 1100, 1105 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974); Tenzer v.
Superscope, Inc., 702 P.2d 212, 217-18 (Cal. 1985); Hamilton v. Funk, 666 P.2d 582,
583 (Haw. 1983); Peacock Realty Co. v. E. Thomas Crandall Farm, Inc., 278 A.2d 405,
410 (R.I. 1971); Frady v. May, 23 S.W.3d 558, 564-66 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2000,
pet. denied).
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favor of the procuring cause doctrine. Surveying the states, it is apparent that some jurisdictions are ignoring the Statute of Frauds requirement as it applies to the treatment of brokers and their rights to
commissions. The sections that follow include a discussion of the different methods courts have used to sidestep particular states' Statute
of Frauds requirements.
1. Arizona
In Arizona, for a broker to receive a commission, the agreement
authorizing employment to purchase or sell the property must be in
writing. 15 6 The case law in Arizona is clear; the Statute of Frauds must
be followed and real estate brokers are assumed to understand the law
as it applies to their profession. 157 According to one court of appeals
in Arizona, however, if the relationship between broker and seller can
be reclassified,
then the Statute of Frauds does not have to be
1 58
applied.
In Ellingson v. Sloan,1 59 the sellers entered a contract with a building contractor to develop the property in a joint venture.1 6 ° Sloan, a
real estate broker, was brought in by the sellers and the contractor to
help with the financing.161 When the agreement with the developer
fell through, the sellers made an oral agreement with Sloan to join
them in the joint venture.1 62 The sellers were faced with great financial difficulty and eventually decided to sell off the property rather
1 63
than develop it, and both parties agreed to abandon the venture.
Because Sloan was a broker, the parties agreed orally that he would
sell the property with the understanding that he would receive compensation for his part in the dealings. 164 A sale was negotiated, but
Sloan never received the compensation to which the parties had orally
agreed. 65 The trial court held for Sloan based on the joint venture
relationship, and the sellers' argument that the oral agreement was
unenforceable based167on Statute of Frauds was rejected.1 66 The court
of appeals affirmed.
While the initial agreement most likely fell under a joint venture
agreement, the parties all agreed to abandon the project and sell the
156. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-101 (West 2003).
157. See McMurran v. Duncan, 155 P. 306, 308 (Ariz. 1916); Olson v. Neale, 570
P.2d 209, 211 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
158. See Ellingson, 527 P.2d at 1105.
159. 527 P.2d 1100 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1974).
160. Id. at 1102.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 1103.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 1105.
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property. 168 At that point, the court determined that the joint venture
did not end just because the sale of the property was a different project than originally agreed upon between the parties. 1 69 The fact that
the parties initially had a joint venture agreement made it easy for the
court to stretch the initial agreement into the second agreement to sell
the property with the assistance of a broker. 170 Because Sloan was
acting under his broker capacity, the Arizona Statute of Frauds should
have been complied with in order for him to fairly receive his commission.' 7 1 Moreover, under Arizona law, a real estate broker is presumed to know the law. 1 72 Therefore, to cover all of his bases, Sloan
should have asked for the agreement to be in writing because he was a
real estate broker.' 73 The oral agreement to sell the property evidenced Sloan's disregard for the law. 1 74 By allowing Sloan to recover
under a joint venture law after the venture was abandoned, the court
of appeals disregarded the Statute of Frauds requirement. 7 5
2.

California

California's Statute of Frauds states that "[a]n agreement authorizing or employing an agent, broker, or any other person to purchase or
sell real estate ... for compensation or a commission" is invalid unless
1 76
there is a written agreement signed by the party to be charged.
In Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc.,1 7 the California Supreme Court ruled
that an unlicensed real estate finder could be entitled to the brokerage
commission under the doctrine of estoppel.17 1 Superscope was a corporation suffering financial difficulties.1 79 The president of the corporation, Tushinsky, invited Tenzer to join the board."8 ' Once a
member, Tenzer learned of the corporation's financial difficulties, as
well as a plan to sell the headquarters to pay off the banks.s" Tenzer
subsequently came into contact with an interested buyer who agreed
to buy. 1 82 Tenzer then contacted Tushinsky and asked for a finder's
fee.' 8 3 Tushinsky assured Tenzer that he would be entitled to such a
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 1103.
Id. at 1104.
See id. at 1104-05.
See ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-101 (West 2003).
See Olson v. Neale, 570 P.2d 209, 211 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-101 (West 2003).
See Ellingson, 527 P.2d at 1103.
See id. at 1103-05.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(a)(4) (West 1985 & Supp. 2004).
702 P.2d 212 (Cal. 1985).
See id. at 221.
Id. at 213.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 214.
Id.
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fee.' 8 4 The closing took place, and eventually the Board voted not to
allow the payment of a finder's fee. a8 5 Tenzer sued both Tushinsky
and the corporation, alleging breach of contract, unjust enrichment,
estoppel, and fraud.18 6 Tushinsky and Superscope were granted summary judgment, and Tenzer appealed to the California Supreme
Court. 8 7
Among Tenzer's three contentions, he suggested that because he
was an unlicensed finder, he was entitled to bring a claim for estoppel. 188 Estoppel may be applied to rectify situations where a party will
suffer due to the other party's unjust enrichment. 189 The court noted
that the Statute of Frauds as applied to real estate brokers has faced
harsh criticism because licensed brokers are unable to argue estoppel
as a defense. 190
The court differentiated between licensed and unlicensed brokers,
concluding that, because licensed brokers must demonstrate an understanding of the law, the law should hold them to a higher standard
than it holds unlicensed brokers' 19 The court compared real estate
finders to unlicensed brokers and stated that finders cannot be held to
the same standard as those who are licensed and presumed to know
the law.1 92 While the court noted that section 1624 does not include a
finder's exception, 9 3 meaning even a finder must reduce the commission agreement to writing, 194 Tenzer was still entitled to estoppel de195
spite section 1624 because the court found unjust enrichment.
However, section 1624(a)(4) clearly states that in order for a broker
or "any other person" to receive compensation or a commission, the
agreement must be in writing.1 96 The court in this case made the point
that the legislature amended the statute twice in response to the interpretations handed down from the courts.' 97 In 1967, the California
Legislature amended the statute to include the words "any other person" to deal with courts interpreting the statute to bar only oral
finder's agreements between licensed brokers and sellers.' 98 The
court acknowledged the Statute of Frauds requirement and the fact
that there was no finder's exception but still awarded a commission to
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.

Id.
Id. at 214-15.
Id. at 215.
See id.
See id. at 215-16.
See id. at 216.
Id. at 217 n.6.
See id. at 217-18.
Id. at 217-18.
Id. at 216.
See id.
Id. at 217-18.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1624(a)(4) (West 1985 & Supp. 2004).
See Tenzer, 702 P.2d at 216.
Id.
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Tenzer.' 99 It is clear that no commission should be granted to a broker or "any other person" absent an agreement in writing. 2" Even if
the statute may have harsh effects, it is still the law and should be
complied with if it is to have any force and effect at all.
3.

Hawaii

Section 656-1 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes states that "[n]o action shall be brought and maintained [in a case] . . . [t]o charge any
person upon any agreement authorizing or employing an agent or broker to purchase or sell real estate for compensation or
commission. 2 0 1
In Hamilton v. Funk,2" 2 the Hawaii Supreme Court held that the
broker was entitled to a commission, even though the broker had blatantly disregarded the statute because the agreement under which the
broker agreed to find a buyer was not in writing.2 °3 Again, the statute
clearly states that no action shall be brought in cases of real estate
commission unless the agreement is in writing.20 4 The agreement was
not in writing, yet the broker brought the buyer and seller together
and expected to earn a commission.20 5 The court reasoned that there
are some cases "where injustice can be avoided only by enforcement
of the promise. "206 This case is a clear example of a court applying
equity principles instead of following the state statute. As argued earlier, equity should be applied in certain instances, but when a professional licensed broker who is charged with knowing the law fails to
follow it, equity should not be the court's choice. One may wonder
why the Hawaii courts refuse to follow a special provision of the Statute of Frauds enacted by the Hawaii Legislature.
4.

Rhode Island

The Statute of Frauds in Rhode Island requires that any agreement
to pay a commission for the sale of real estate must be in writing and
signed by the party to be charged.20 7 In 1967, the Supreme Court of
Rhode Island expressly stated that a real estate broker is not entitled
to a commission absent a written agreement.20 8 The court also held
that allowing estoppel to be used as a defense to the Statute of Frauds
when real estate brokerage agreements are in question would invali199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.

See id. at 216-18.
§ 1624(a)(4).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 656-1 (2002).
666 P.2d 582 (Haw. 1983).
See id. at 583.
See HAW. REV. STAT. § 656-1 (2002).
Hamilton, 666 P.2d at 583.
Id.
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-4 (1997).
Heyman v. Adeack Realty Co., 228 A.2d 578, 581 (R.I. 1967).
CAL. CIv. CODE
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date the very purpose of the statute itself, namely, to protect against
unfounded claims.2 °9
In a cause of action for recovery of commissions under brokerage
agreements based on an oral promise, the Rhode Island Supreme
Court found in favor of the broker, thereby affirming the lower
court's judgment. 21° The broker had orally agreed with the seller to
act as the broker in return for a ten percent commission for his work
in finding a buyer for defendant's farmland.211 The broker was able to
locate a buyer, leading to the written agreement between the defendant and the buyer.212 Because
the seller did not pay the broker com213
mission, a trial ensued.
The court decided to focus on the issue of whether the "buy and sell
agreement between [the parties] ... and signed by both [would] suf-

fice as a note or memorandum of the defendant's oral agreement to
pay plaintiff a commission upon the sale., 214 The sales agreement
made no mention of the commission statement, resulting in a case of
first impression for the court.2 15 Authorities note that a writing will be
found "inadequate if it fails to state the amount of the compensation
or the commission to be paid to the agent or broker., 216 Instead of
looking to the available authorities and to the statute itself, the court
relied mainly on principles of equity.21 7 Even though an employee of
the defendant admitted on the stand that there was such an oral
agreement, the statute clearly states that all such agreements must be
in writing. 218 The broker, who was a professional broker of farmland,
should have been held to the same standard as all other brokers who
are presumed to know the law.2 19

The court relied on case law from other states that allowed admissions, in the form of testimony, to satisfy the written memorandum
requirement. 220 The Statute of Frauds can have harsh effects, but that
alone should not keep courts from upholding the law. Again, the purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to protect all of the parties from unscrupulous actors.221 Moreover, Rhode Island, along with the other
states, established licensing regulations for further protection.222 The
209. Id. at 580.
210. Peacock Realty Co. v. E. Thomas Crandall Farm, Inc., 278 A.2d 405, 405, 410
(R.I. 1971).
211. Id. at 406.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 407.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 408.
217. See id. at 408, 410.
218. Id. at 408.
219. See LEFCOE, supra note 20, at 53.
220. Peacock Realty Co., 278 A.2d at 409.
221. MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 4, at 146.
222. See LEFCOE, supra note 20, at 53 n.152.
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parties involved in the transaction are put at risk of falling prey to
fraud every time a court uses its discretion to ignore the regulations
set forth by the state.2 23 If a person is in the business of selling real
estate, that person should have to conform to the law. If the broker
fails to meet the requirements, he does so at his own risk.22 4
V.

PROPOSAL

State legislatures have made special provisions in their Statutes of
Frauds in regards to real estate brokers receiving commissions in order to prevent fraudulent claims by either party.2 25 Among these
states, some jurisdictions have chosen to apply equity principles rather
than the statute in order to compensate the broker because most often
the broker did procure a ready, willing, and able buyer.22 6 Even
though it may seem fair to apply equitable principles at times, the2 7law
If
clearly states that a written contract or memorandum is required.
that prerequisite is not satisfied, then the courts should not even go to
the next step as dictated by their state legislatures.22 By ignoring the
statutes as set forth by their respective state legislatures, these states
act to nullify the legislative purposes of protecting the owners of real
estate.229
Among the three views,2 3 ° the best choice, in order to prevent
fraudulent claims made by brokers as well as sellers, is to follow the
states that have some form of Statute of Frauds requirement that expressly excludes recovery by quantum meruit. The various state
courts that overlook the Statute of Frauds requirement for fairness
reasons should not be allowed to do so. States that have some form of
Statute of Frauds should further amend their statutes to include language stating that quantum meruit or equitable estoppel shall not be
applied in real estate commission situations. Such a statute might contain the following:
An action may not be brought in a court in this state for the recovery of a commission for the sale or purchase of real estate unless the
promise or agreement on which the action is brought, or some
memorandum thereof, is in writing and signed by the party to be
charged or signed by a person lawfully authorized by the party to
sign it,2 ' and recovery under the theory of quantum meruit shall
not be allowed where there is no such writing.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
ANN.

Id. at 53.
Id.
Id. at 52-53.
See supra text accompanying notes 153-208.
See supra text accompanying notes 153-208.
See supra text accompanying notes 47-65.
See Marvel, supra note 61, at 907 n.10.
See supra text accompanying notes 75-103.
Some wording taken from the current Texas statute. See TEX. Occ. CODE
§ 1101.806(c) (Vernon 2003).
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Such reinforcement of the Statute of Frauds requirements would put
all professional real estate brokers on notice that they are risking their
commissions if they do not strictly adhere to their states' regulations.
By reinforcing the brokerage Statute of Frauds, all the parties involved should receive better protection. Furthermore, such brightline rules also serve the purpose of preserving judicial efficiency.
In Roseberry v. Heckler,3 2 the broker did, in fact, procure a ready,
willing, and able buyer, but the commission statement was made
orally between the broker and the seller.133 The Arizona Supreme
Court held that "there is no particular hardship in requiring the broker to secure from the owner his signature to something written specifying the exact terms which he has indicated as acceptable. '2 34 It has
also been stated that brokers who choose to ignore the law and fail to
obtain a written commission agreement "can expect no assistance
from the courts in their effort to extricate themselves from their own
235
folly.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to protect real estate owners
against the possibility of unfounded claims made by unscrupulous brokers. This purpose will not be satisfied if the brokerage statute is allowed to be sidestepped when brokers choose not to follow the law.
While the law may be harsh, in this instance it is better to have a
bright-line rule that is to be followed in order to protect the parties
and preserve judicial efficiency.
Stephanie Councilman
232. 326 P.2d 365 (Ariz. 1958).
233. Id. at 365-66.
234. Id. at 366.
235. LEFCOE, supra note 20, at 53.
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